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OHIO ADOPTS MASSACHUSETTS RULE
FOR TENTATIVE TRUSTS
IN RE ESTATE OF HOFFMAN
175 Ohio St. 363, r95 N.E. 2d
xo6 (x963).
Seven savings account passbooks found among the belongings of the
decedent were included in the inventory of his estate by the administra-
trix. Each passbook was in the name of the decedent as trustee for an-
other. Of the seven separate accounts there were five intended benefici-
aries, one to each account, with two beneficiaries being designated to two
accounts. Three of the beneficiaries filed exceptions to the inventory. The
Probate Court sustained the exceptions, finding that the savings accounts
were trusts and not a proper part of the inventory. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision while finding that the signature cards contained the
signature of the decedent and the typewritten word "Trustee", that the
decedent had retained complete control over the passbooks and accounts
during his lifetime, and that the named beneficiaries had no knowledge
of the accounts until the passbooks were found among the decedent's effects.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision, holding that there must
be clear and convincing evidence of the present intent of the depositor to
create a trust, that the mere word "trustee" on the passbooks was equivo-
cal, and that, since there was nothing more to show the depositor's intent,
no trust was created.'
In In re Estate of Hoffman 2, Ohio has followed the minority view of
the few states that have considered the validity of savings deposit trusts
on similar facts. 3 The majority view was pronounced by the Supreme
Court of New York in 1904 in In re Totten.4 These savings deposit
trusts have since become known as "tentative" or "Totten" trusts.
The Totten trust is a testamentary device used as a substitute for a
will, and is closely related in form to the familiar inter vivos revocable
trust.5  The features distinguishing the Totten trust and the inter vivos
revocable trust are the degree of control that the settlor retains over the
trust res during his lifetime and the manifestation of the settlor's intent
when the trust is created.
I lt re Estate of Hoffman, 175 Ohio St. 363, 195 N.E.2d 106 (1963).
2 Ibid.
3 Only about one-fifth of the estates have considered the validity of the savings
account trust. About eight states have sustained it under the New York rule.
Comment, "Totten-An Anomaly in Trusts," 6 DePaul L. Rev. 117 (1956).
4 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
r, The inter vivos revocable trust is accepted in Ohio. Stevenson, "The Amazing
Revocable Trust: A Study in Contradictions," 32 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 1 (1963) ; Gold-
man and De Camp, "When is a Trust not a Trust," 16 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 191 (1942).
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Because the Totten trust purports to be an inter vivos revocable trust
in form, the intent of the settlor as expressed in his self-declaration of trust
becomes the controlling factor. It is generally accepted that the settlor's
expression of intent must be clear and unequivocal to sustain a revocable
trust. His intent to reserve the power of revocation and a life interest in
the trust estate must be properly expressed by his words or conduct.6
However, in the Totton trust, the only evidence of the depositor's intent
is the form of the deposit, i.e., "A in trust for B." Therefore, the immedi-
ate problem confronting a court passing on the validity of such a trust is
determining the depositor's intention. Where there was no evidence of
intent other than the form of the deposit, the courts before li re Totten
held that the depositor had either created an irrevocable trust, or no trust
at all.7 The New York cases held that there was no trust unless there was
other evidence of intent, in which case an irrevocable trust was created 8
In re Totten then added the third possibility, holding that in the absence
of evidence showing that no trust at all or an irrevocable trust was in-
tended, a revocable trust was created.9 Thus the Totten trust differs in
the first instance from the ordinary revocable trust in that the settlor's in-
tent is presumed rather than expressly stated.
The second distinction between the ordinary revocable trust and the
Totten trust is the degree of control retained by the settlor over the trust.
Where the settlor declares himself trustee, reserves the power of revoca-
tion and retains a life estate in the beneficial interest, the trust is generally
upheld where it can be shown that the settlor intended to create an im-
mediate equitable interest in the beneficiary by the declaration of trust.
The trust may be upheld even though the beneficiary has no knowledge
of it until the settlor's death.'L Such a disposition differs very little from
that which is made when the settlor transfers the property to another as
trustee and reserves these same rights and powers in himself. In both
cases, the trust must be administered according to its terms.1 In contrast,
the settlor in a Totten trust exercises such complete control over the de-
posit that he retains absolute ownership. He is free to deal with it as
his own, leaving the residue at his death to the beneficiary. Such a trust
6 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 330, comments b and c (1959); 1 Scott,
Trusts, §§ 23, 24, 57.6 (1956).
7 It appears that In re Totten is the first case holding that a revocable trust
was created. In Cazallis v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. (35)9 (1920), and in
Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 180 Atl. 315 (1935), irrevocable trusts were created.
Hogarth-Swann v. Steele, 294 Mass. 396, 2 N.E.2d 446 (1936) and Mulloy v.
Charlestown Five Cents Savings Bank, 285 Mass. 101, 108 N.E. 608 (1934) held that
no trust at all was created.
8 Beaver v. Beaver, 137 N.Y. 59, 32 N.E. 998 (1893); Martin v. Funk, 75
N.Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446 (1878).
9 Supra note 4.
10 1 Scott Trusts, § 57.6 (1956); Restatement (Second), Trusts § 36, com-
ment a (1959).
11 1 Scott, op. cit. supra note 10, at 476; Goldman and De Camp, .mpra note
5, at 205.
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would ordinarily be considered testamentary and held invalid unless the
Statute of Wills were complied with, but the Totten trust is an excep-
tion to this general rule.12  When confronted with the testamentary fea-
tures of the trust, the New York courts upheld the trust by saying that
an equitable interest in the deposit passed to the beneficiary when the
deposit was made, but the trust thereby created was "tentative" as the gift
of the deposit could have been revoked by the depositor or completed by
him by some decisive act or declaration. The court concluded that be-
cause the depositor died without revoking or completing the gift, the pre-
sumption arose that an absolute trust of the balance remaining on deposit
at the depositor's death was created.' 3  Thus we have a bequest device in-
valid as a will but nevertheless upheld through the use of legal fiction in
labeling the device a "trust" even though it goes beyond the most liberal
requirements of the inter vivos trust.
Despite the legal shortcomings of the Totten trust, it has been accepted
in the majority of the states which have considered it, because there ap-
pears to be little public policy against it. This device enables the depositor
to distribute small amounts 14 of his estate conveniently, because it elimi-
nates following the rigid formalities, expense, and delay inherent in the
Statute of Wills and probate hearings. There is no infringement upon the
rights of third parties, as the trust is generally subject to inheritance 5
and federal estate taxes,'6 the claims of creditors 17 and in some juridic-
tions the claim of the surviving spouse.' 8 Also the amount involved is
easily identified and cannot be altered by forgery, nor can the named
beneficiary be changed without the consent of the depositor because a
duplicate record of the account is kept by the bank. Therefore, the danger
12 1 Scott, Trusts § 58.3 (1956); Restatement (Second), Trusts § 58 (1959).
But see Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. Civ. App. 340, 172 S.W2d 975 (1943).
3 In re Totten, supra note 4.
14 Contra to the argument that in most cases the amount involved is small,
the total amount of the seven deposits in Hoffman was $66,780.90.
15 Scott, "The Effects of the Power to Revoke a Trust," 57 Harv. L. Rev.
362 (1944) ; 29 Ohio Jur. 2d Inheritance and Estate Taxes § 30 (1958) ; Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 5731.02 (Page Supp. 1962).
16 Wasserman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 139 F2d 778 (1st Cir.
1944).
17 Most states have statutes protecting the claims of creditors by enabling them
to reach the trust fund. See 1 Scott, Trusts, § 58.5 (1956). The language of Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1335.01 (Page Supp. 1963) validating the revocable trust was relied
upon by the Court of Appeals in Hoffman, but the Supreme Court noted that the
statute, a part of the chapter entitled "Statute of Frauds," deals with formal written
trust deeds and is designed to protect creditors from fraudulent conveyances, and has
no weight in determining the validity of a trust. In re Estate of Hoffman, supra
note 1, at 366, 195 N.E.2d at 108.
Is 1 Scott, Trusts, § 58.5 (1956). But cf. Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172
Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E2d 60 (1961). The testator created an inter vivos trust with
the Trust Company. The court held that the widow, electing to take under the
statute of descent and distribution, could not claim the property held in trust. Query,
whether the Ohio courts would apply this rule to the savings deposit trust?
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of fraudulent claims, protected against by the Statute of Wills, is absent. 19
Finally, it is argued that the majority of such depositors really intend to
make a gift, and the law should not be so strict as to require the layman
to be aware of and follow the technical requirements of making an effective
testamentary transfer. Instead, the law should be lenient in this regard
and uphold the layman's presumed intent in the absence of fraud or abuse.
The conflict between the legal and policy considerations of the Totten
trust has led to different treatments of the device among the jurisdictions
that have passed on its validity. A Texas court, for example, found that
the mere form of a man's savings deposit was not sufficient evidence of
intent to create a trust, and in any event the disposition was testamentary
in character, and therefore invalid.20  A Connecticut statute required
banks to supply a detailed signature card to all depositors.21 The Connecti-
cut court, in Fasano v. Meliso, 22 held that this signature card was sufficient
evidence of intent, but that the trust was invalid because it lacked the
essential elements of an ordinary trust, i.e., a present, unequivocal dispo-
sition of some interest in the trust to a beneficiary so that legal and equit-
able title is in two different persons, not the same person. However,
Fasano was overcome in 1962 when the statute involved was amended.
Connecticut now follows the Totten trust by statute.23  The Totten trust
has also led to much confusion in New Jersey. Early cases followed the
Texas rule and held that the trusts were testamentary and therefore in-
valid. 24 But a 1954 statute2 5 created an irrebuttable presumption that any
such deposit, regardless of other evidence of contrary intent, created a gift
for the named beneficiary. This statute was held unconstitutional in How-
ard Savings Institution v. Quatra,26 but a recent decision 27 questioned the
soundness of the Quatra case, and held the statute constitutional while
upholding a Totten-type trust. The Machachusetts rule requires some-
thing more than the form of the deposit to show an intent to create a valid
trust. This rule, as stated in O'Hara v. O'Hara28 has been followed by
the 1963 decision of Reagan v. Phillips.29 Other Massachusetts cases
upheld the savings deposit trust where there was other evidence that the
depositor intended to create a trust.30 In the instant case, the court, in
citing O'Hara, indicated that Ohio will follow the Massachusetts rule.
19 34 Conn. Bar. J. 67, 73 (1960) ; But see, Comment, "Trusts which Substitute
for Wills," 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 113 (1956).
20 Fleck v. Baldwin, supra note 12.
21 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-110 (1960).
22 146 Conn. Supp. 496, 152 A.2d 512 (1959).
23 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-110 (Supp. 1962).
24 Nicklas v. Parker, 71 N.J. Eq. 777, 71 Atl. 1135 (1907).
25 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17: 9A-216 (1963).
26 38 N.J. Super. 174, 118 A.2d 121 (1955).
27 Howard Savings Institution v. Kielb, 38 N.J. 186, 183 A2d 401 (1962).
28 291 Mass. 75, 195 N.E. 909 (1935).
29 345 Mass. 387, 187 N.E.2d 801 (1963).
30 Cohen v. Newton Savings Bank, 320 Mass. 23, 67 N.E.2d 748 (1946) ; Greely
v. Flynn, 310 Mass. 23, 36 N.E.2d 394 (1941).
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The court apparently felt that the other possible reasons for establishing
an account in a trust form, such as to conceal one's financial position,
to avoid a legal limit on the size of savings accounts, or possibly to avoid
the claims of third persons, rendered speculative the notion that the de-
positor's intent was to create an inter vivos trust. In requiring clear and
convincing evidence of intent, the court followed the rule applied to the
inter vivos revocable trust in Ohio,2 ' thus implying that where the deposi-
tor's intent is clear the savings deposit trust will be upheld as an inter vivos
revocable trust despite the extreme degree of control of the deposit re-
tained by the depositor-trustee. Past Ohio savings deposit cases upholding
a trust where the depositor's intent was unequivocal, support this conten-
tion.32 Thus it appears that Ohio has adopted the Massachusetts rule.
The question left unanswered by the Hoffman case is what constitutes
clear and convincing evidence? The court in Adams v. Fleck, referring
to an inter vivos revocable trust, implied that a formal trust document is
required.33 The Hoffman case, referring to Adams as authority for the
"clear and convincing" evidence rule, used this same language. But the
syllabi in both cases do not mention formal documents, but only clear and
convincing evidence. Perhaps the courts in both cases felt that because
of the testamentary nature of the trusts involved, the declarations of trust
should be in writing. 4 In a large percentage of revocable trusts in Ohio,
the trustee is a professional trust company, and the trust agreement is
invariably expressed in a formal written instrument. Such an instrument
is obviously the most practical means of expressing the settlor's intent and
setting forth the rights and powers of the settlor and trust company. It
is perhaps this written instrument, used when the trust property is trans-
ferred to professional trustee, that the Ohio cases have reference to when
they imply that clear and convincing evidence means a formal written
document. However, in refusing formally to require a written document,
the Ohio court has left open the possibility of creating a revocable trust
by parol in other situations. That a revocable trust can be created orally
in many situations has long been the Ohio law.35 Perhaps then the bank
account trust is one of those situations where a revocable trust can be
created without a formal written document, as this trust does not involve
a transfer of property to an individual fiduciary or trust company. This
contention finds support in the prior Ohio bank account trust cases,36 , the
31 Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 172 N.E2d 126 (1961).
32 Thomas v. Dye, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 118, 127 N.E.2d 228 (Ct App. 1954);
Jones v. Luplow, 13 Ohio App. 428 (1920); Herrmann v. Brighton German Bank,
16 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 47 (Super. Ct. of Cinc. 1914) (irrevocable trust).
33 Adams v. Fleck, supra note 31, "(T)his court has gone far in recognizing
inter vivos trusts as valid ... only in those cases where there has been a formal trust
instrument that definitely eliminated any question as to the donor's intent."
34 See Stevenson, supra note 5, at 6.
35 Ibid.
36 Cases cited note 32, supra. These cases made no mention of formal trust
instruments.
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Massachusetts cases 7 , and the court's language in the instant case.38
Until the court decides otherwise, it appears that any evidence showing
an unequivocal intent to create a bank account trust will constitute clear
and convincing evidence under the Ohio rule.
The few Ohio cases involving the savings deposit trust indicate that
this device has been of little use to donors in Ohio. This is perhaps due
to the wide acceptance of the joint and survivorship bank account as a
means of testamentary disposition.39 The joint and survivorship account
is closely analogous to the savings deposit trust. just as in the savings
deposit trust, the depositor in a joint bank account who wishes to make a
valid gift of the deposit at death can retain possession of the passbook,
the power to revoke, and can generally treat the account as his own during
his lifetime.4 0  Generally the beneficiary of a joint depositor has knowledge
of the deposit and signs the signature card along with the depositor; how-
ever, in Rhorbacker v. Citizens Building Ass'n4l a joint account gift was
held valid where the depositor retained possession of the passbook, and
the beneficiary neither signed the signature card nor knew of the deposit
until the depositor's death.
Through the use of the joint and survivorship bank account, the re-
vocable trust, and the savings deposit trust, the Ohio law provides great
flexibility for those wishing to make testamentary dispositions of cash
while avoiding the requirements of the Statute of Wills. It seems that the
requirement of clear and convincing evidence of intent, particularly in the
savings deposit trust, will add to this flexibility the needed protection
against fraud and abuse while affording greater assurance to the donor
that his intention will be given effect.
37 Cohen v. Newton Savings Bank, supra note 30 (the depositor's intent was
indicated by clear language on the signature card) ; Greely v. Flynn, supra note 30
(the depositor gave the passbook to the beneficiary, thus making his intent clear).
3a Supra note 1, at 367, 368; 195 N.E.2d at 109, 110:
Where there is a formal trust instrument, the settlor's intention is clearly
shown. Without a formal trust instrument, the intention and terms of the
trust must be implied .... Where a trust is claimed in savings bank deposit
... there being no formal trust instrument, no relinquishing of any control
and no knowledge of the purported beneficiaries, a trust is not created.
While the court says that a formal trust instrument is sufficient to show intent to
create the trust, the court also implies that other extrinsic evidence will suffice.
39 Close, "Joint Bank Accounts in Ohio," 11 W. Res. L. Rev. 511 (1960).
40 Goldman and De Camp, supra note 5.
41 138 Ohio St. 273, 34 N.E.2d 751 (1941). The joint and survivorship bank
account is predicated on the contract theory. The court here held that the contract
ran between the depositor and the bank, with the named beneficiary of the account
as a third party beneficiary to this contract. This precedent has been followed by the
case of In re Estate of Di Santo, 142 Ohio St. 223, 51 N.E.2d 639 (1943).
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